Self-Correcting Information Cascades by Jacob K. Goeree et al.
Self-correcting Information Cascades1
Jacob K. Goeree, Thomas R. Palfrey, Brian W. Rogers, and Richard D. McKelvey2
March 9, 2006
Abstract
We report experimental results from long sequences of decisions in environments that are theo-
retically prone to severe information cascades. Observed behavior is much di®erent|information
cascades are ephemeral. We study the implications of a model based on quantal response equi-
librium, in which the observed cascade formation/collapse/formation cycles arise as equilib-
rium phenomena. Consecutive cascades may reverse states and usually such a reversal is self-
correcting: the cascade switches to the correct state. We extend the model to allow for base
rate neglect and ¯nd strong evidence for over-weighting of private information. The estimated
belief trajectories indicate fast and e±cient learning dynamics.
JEL classi¯cation numbers: C92, D82, D83
Key words: social learning, information cascades, laboratory experiments
1Financial support from the National Science Foundation (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred
P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The theory and experimental design was partially completed,
and pilot experiments were conducted in collaboration with Richard McKelvey, who died in April 2002. He
is not responsible for any errors in the paper. We acknowledge helpful comments from Bo¸ gacen C »elen, Terry
Sovinsky, three anonymous referees, the managing editor, seminar participants at GREQAM, Harvard University,
Johns Hopkins University, NYU, Penn State University, Princeton University, UCLA, Universitat Autonoma de
Barcelona, University of Edinburgh, Washington University, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the
2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, the 2003
ESSET meetings in Gerzensee, the 2004 PIER conference on Political Economy, and the 2004 Summer Festival
on Game Theory at Stony Brook.
2Corresponding author: Thomas Palfrey, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
08544 tpalfrey@princeton.edu. Goeree and Rogers: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Insti-
tute of Technology, Mail code 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. McKelvey: Deceased.1. Introduction
An information cascade arises when a sequence of imperfectly informed decision makers,
each of whom observes all previous decisions, has reached a point after which all future decision
makers will rationally ignore their private information. Hence, learning ceases as subsequent
decision makers infer nothing new from observing any of the actions. Information cascades
are predicted to occur, possibly after very few decisions, despite the wealth of information
available and despite the common interest of all decision makers (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani
et al. 1992). This result, if robust to variations in the basic model, has obvious and pernicious
implications for economic welfare, and raises problematic issues for various applications of mass
information aggregation, such as bank runs, technology adoption, mass hysteria, and political
campaigns.
We conducted laboratory experiments with very long sequences of decision makers in canoni-
cal social learning environments. The data is examined and analyzed through the lens of quantal
response equilibrium (QRE), which makes systematic predictions about the long run dynamics of
choice behavior, beliefs, and e±ciency. Some of these predictions are essentially the opposite of
Nash equilibrium. Because of the complicated dynamics implied by QRE, a careful test of many
of these properties of QRE demands the observation of long sequences. In addition, we vary the
informativeness of individuals' signals, which systematically a®ects the observable properties of
QRE dynamics.
The QRE approach to the analysis of data enables two additional innovations. First, using
a Logit equilibrium error structure we are able to structurally estimate a parametric model of
base rate neglect and a cognitive hierarchy model of strategic sophistication. The existence and
magnitude of judgement fallacies in these environments has important systematic implications
about e±ciency and dynamics. Second, this structural estimation approach yields estimates of
the entire trajectory of public beliefs, for each sequence in the experiment. That is, the belief
dynamics can be estimated indirectly without eliciting beliefs from the decision makers.
We use the simplest possible social learning environment in our experiment because QRE
makes especially crisp predictions in these environments, enabling relatively straightforward
tests of the predictions while at the same time simplifying the structural estimation procedure.
There are two equally likely states of nature, two signals, two actions, and T decision makers.
Nature moves ¯rst and chooses a state, and then reveals to each decision maker a private signal
about the state. The probability a decision maker receives a correct signal is q > 1=2 in both
states of the world. Decision makers choose sequentially, with each decision maker observing all
previous actions (and her private signal). A decision maker receives a payo® of 1 if she chooses
1q = 5/9 q = 5/9 q = 6/9 q = 6/9
T = 20 T = 40 T = 20 T = 40
# sequences 116 56 90 60
# sequences with pure cascades 5 0 12 8
# sequences without cascades 0 0 0 0
# sequences with broken cascades 111 56 78 52
Table 1. Percentages of (broken) cascades in our data.
the correct action and 0 otherwise. In this environment, learning never progresses very far in
a Nash equilibrium. In fact, regardless of T, the equilibrium beliefs of all decision makers are
con¯ned to an interval centered around 1=2.
The need for an alternative theory of behavior in these environments is obvious from looking
at data from short decision sequences, such as those reported in Anderson and Holt (AH) (1997).1
In that experiment, cascades are observed, however some action choices are inconsistent with
Nash equilibrium given the realized signals, and many subjects exhibit such behavior. For
example, Anderson and Holt (1997) observe that in their experiment with q = 2=3 and T =
6, more than 25% of the time subjects make a choice against the cascade after receiving a
contradictory signal. And nearly 5% of subjects who receive a signal consistent with the cascade
choose the opposite action. Such deviations become even more pronounced in the experiments
reported below where we vary the signal precision, q = 5=9 and q = 6=9, and the number of
decision makers, T = 20 and T = 40. With this many decision makers we should observe
cascades arising in 100% of the sequences according to the theoretical model of Bikhchandani
et al. (1992). However, with T = 40, for instance, a cascade arises and persists in only 8 out of
116 sequences (< 7%).
Table 1 gives an illustration of a few ways that the standard theory fares badly. At a
minimum, a plausible theory should explain two systematic features of the data. First, o®-the-
Nash-equilibrium-path actions occur with signi¯cant probability. The theory as it stands does
not place adequate restrictions o® the equilibrium path. Second, deviations from equilibrium are
systematic, indicating that such behavior is informative! Why? Because going o® the equilibrium
path (i.e., choosing an action opposite to the cascade) happens much more frequently if the player
received a signal contradicting the cascade choices, see Table 2. Indeed, when a break occurs,
1Indeed AH use a recursive version of Logit equilibrium to describe their data.
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Table 2. Frequency of con¯rmatory/contrary signals when cascades are (not) broken.
the observed frequency with which the received signal was contradictory is 83%.2 This should
come as no surprise as a deviation following a con¯rmatory signal is a worse deviation (e.g., in
terms of expected payo®s, and also intuitively) than a deviation following a contradictory signal.
The introduction of a random component in QRE ensures that all paths can be reached with
positive probability, so Bayes' rule places restrictions on future rational inferences and behavior
when a deviation from a cascade occurs. Deviations from optimal play occur according to a
statistical process and players take these deviations into account when making inferences and
decisions. Moreover, deviations or mistakes are payo® dependent in the sense that the likelihood
of a mistake is inversely related to its cost.3
In this paper, we demonstrate that QRE predicts the temporary and self-correcting nature
of cascades and also predicts several features of the long run dynamics, as a function of signal
informativeness. QRE predicts that with an in¯nite horizon the true state will be revealed
with probability one, i.e. learning is complete. While no ¯nite experiment can formally test
this prediction, our ability to structurally estimate public beliefs with QRE allows us to draw
inferences about the rate at which beliefs are converging to full revelation.4
Following the pioneering paper of Anderson and Holt (1997), there have been a number of
studies exploring di®erent questions related to information cascades. Hung and Plott (2001)
replicate the original ¯ndings and also explore information aggregation in a voting mecha-
2When averaged over the four treatments. In the (q = 5
9;T = 20), (q = 5
9;T = 40), (q = 6
9;T = 20), and
(q = 6
9;T = 40) treatments the numbers are 87%, 78%, 87%, and 82% respectively.
3We only consider monotone quantal response equilibrium, where choice probabilities are monotone in ex-
pected utilities, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) and Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005).
4Longer sequences of decisions could possibly be obtained from an Internet experiment where agents are
successively invited to participate (see Drehmann, Oechsler, and Roider, 2005).
3nism. C »elen and Kariv (2004) di®erentiate between information cascades and herds. Huck
and Oechssler (2000), Dominitz and Hung (2004), NÄ oth and Weber (2003), and Oberhammer
and Stiehler (2003) explore whether decision makers are following Bayes' rule in their updating
process, and ¯nd evidence that Bayes' rule is systematically violated. Some of the other exten-
sions involve cascades in networks (Choi et al., 2005), the e®ect of advice (C »elen et al., 2005),
costly signals (KÄ ubler and WeizsÄ acker, 2004), and herd behavior in stock markets (Cipriani and
Guarino, 2005; Drehmann et al., 2005). The negative relationship between the duration of a
cascade and the probability of collapse is demonstrated in KÄ ubler and WeizsÄ acker (2005) across
several di®erent studies, and is consistent with our own ¯ndings and with the predictions of the
QRE model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and
presents the main theoretical properties of QRE dynamics, which deliver hypotheses that are
directly testable with data from our experiment. Section 3 explains the experimental design.
Section 4 contains a descriptive analysis of the data, focusing on cascade dynamics and choice
behavior. Section 5 presents an econometric analysis of the basic model and extensions that
better explain the data. Section 6 discusses the belief dynamics implied by the structural es-
timation and the resulting e±ciency properties of the data. Appendix A contains proofs and
Appendix B contains the estimation program.
2. The Basic Model
There is a ¯nite set T = f1;2;:::;Tg of agents who sequentially choose between one of two
alternatives, A and B. Agent t chooses at time t, and let ct 2 fA;Bg denote agent t's choice.
One of the alternatives is selected by nature as \correct," and an agent receives a payo® of 1 only
when she selects this alternative, otherwise she gets 0. The correct alternative (or state of the
world), denoted by ! 2 fA;Bg, is unknown to the agents who have common prior beliefs that
! = A or ! = B with probability 1
2. Further, they receive conditionally independent private
signals st regarding the better alternative. If ! = A then st = a with probability q 2 (1
2;1) and
st = b with probability 1 ¡ q. Likewise, when ! = B, st = b with probability q and st = a with
probability 1 ¡ q.
We will be concerned with the evolution of agents' beliefs, and how these beliefs co-evolve
with actions. Agent t observes the actions of all her predecessors, but not their signals. Thus a
history Ht for agent t is simply a sequence fc1;:::;ct¡1g of choices by agents 1;¢¢¢;t ¡ 1, with
4H1 = ;. Agents care about the history only to the extent that it is informative about which
alternative is correct. So let pt ´ P(! = AjHt) denote the (common knowledge) posterior belief
that A is correct given the choice history Ht, with p1 ´ 1
2, the initial prior. We ¯rst determine
agent t's private posterior beliefs given the public beliefs pt and given her signal st. Applying
Bayes' rule shows that if st = a, agent t believes that alternative A is correct with probability
¼
a
t(pt) ´ P(! = AjHt;st = a) =
q pt





t(pt) ´ P(! = AjHt;st = b) =
(1 ¡ q)pt
(1 ¡ q)pt + q(1 ¡ pt)
(2.2)
is the probability with which agent t believes that A is correct if her private signal is st = b.
A direct computation veri¯es that ¼a
t(pt) > pt > ¼b
t(pt) for all 0 < pt < 1. In other words, for
any interior public belief an agent believes more strongly that ! = A after observing an a signal
than after observing a b signal.
2.1. Nash Equilibrium
We ¯rst discuss the dynamics of beliefs and choice behavior in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium of the game, identi¯ed by Bikhchandani et al.
(1992), involves rapid convergence to an information cascade.
This pure cascade Nash equilibrium works as follows.5 The ¯rst agent chooses A if s1 = a,
and chooses B if s1 = b, so that her choice perfectly reveals her signal. If the second agent's
signal agrees with the ¯rst agent's choice, the second agent chooses the same alternative, which
is strictly optimal. On the other hand, if the second agent's signal disagrees with the ¯rst agent's
choice, the second agent is indi®erent, as she e®ectively has a sample of one a and one b. For
comparison to the Quantal Response Equilibrium discussed next, we assume that the second
agent randomizes uniformly when indi®erent.6 The third agent faces two possible situations:
(i) the choices of the ¯rst two agents coincide, or (ii) the ¯rst two choices di®er. In case (i), it
is strictly optimal for the third agent to make the same choice as her predecessors, even if her
5As we will see, almost all choice sequences in our laboratory data are inconsistent with the behavior implied
by this Nash equilibrium.
6This randomization holds in any Logit QRE. There are other Nash equilibria where players randomize with
di®erent probabilities when indi®erent, but none of these equilibria are trembling hand perfect. In the unique
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium indi®erent players follow their signal with probability 1. For details see Goeree
et al. (2006).
5signal is contrary. Thus her choice imparts no information to her successors, resulting in the
onset of a cascade. The fourth agent is then in the same situation as the third, and so also makes
the same choice, a process which continues inde¯nitely. In case (ii), however, the choices of the
¯rst two agents reveal that they have received one a signal and one b signal, leaving the third
agent in e®ectively the same position as the ¯rst. Her posterior (before considering her private
information) is p3 = 1
2, so that her signal completely determines her choice. The fourth agent
would then be in the same situation as the second agent described above, and so forth. Thus a
cascade begins after some even number of agents have chosen and j#A ¡ #Bj = 2, where #A
is the number of decision makers who have chosen A and #B is the number of decision makers
who have chosen B.
One quantity of interest is the probability that \correct" and \incorrect" cascades will form
in equilibrium. First, the probability of being in neither cascade vanishes rapidly as t grows. The
probability of eventually reaching a correct cascade is
q(1+q)
2¡2q(1¡q), and the complementary proba-
bility of eventually reaching an incorrect cascade is
(q¡2)(q¡1)
2¡2q(1¡q).7;8 Once a cascade has formed, all
choices occur independently of private information, and hence public beliefs remain unchanged.
The points at which public beliefs settle are the posteriors that obtain after two consecutive
choices for the same alternative, beginning with uninformative prior.
2.2. Quantal Response Equilibrium
We now describe the logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of the model described above.
In the logit QRE, each individual t privately observes a payo® disturbance for each choice,
denoted ²A
t and ²B
t . The payo®-relevant information for agent t is summarized by the di®erence
²t ´ ²A
t ¡ ²B
t . Denote agent t's type by µt = (st;²t). The logit speci¯cation assumes that the
²t are independent and obey a logistic distribution with parameter ¸.9;10 The disturbance, ²t,
can be interpreted in several di®erent ways. For example, it could represent a stochastic part
of decision making due to bounded rationality, or it could be an individual-speci¯c preference
7After the ¯rst two choices, the probabilities of the three regimes, correct cascade, no cascade yet, or incorrect
cascade, are: 1
2q(1 + q); q(1 ¡ q); and 1








; (q(1 ¡q))t; 1






. Taking limits as t approaches
in¯nity yields the long run probabilities of the three regimes.
8Thus as q increases from 1
2 to 1, the probability of landing in a good cascade grows from 1
2 to 1.
9This arises when ²A
t and ²B
t are i:i:d: extreme-value distributed.
10The properties derived in this section hold for all atomless error distributions that have full support over the
interval [¡1;1]. The logit speci¯cation is convenient because its behavior is determined by a single parameter
with a natural \rationality" interpretation.
6shock that occurs for other reasons. Irrespective of the interpretation of the noise, the resulting
logit choice model implies that the stronger the belief that A is correct, the more likely action
A is chosen. The logit QRE model assumes that the distribution of the payo® disturbances is
common knowledge.11 The logit QRE is calculated as the sequential equilibrium of the resulting
game of incomplete information, where each player observes only her own type µt.
It is straightforward to characterize the optimal decision of agent t given her type µt and the
history Ht (which determines public beliefs pt). The expected payo® of choosing A is ¼
st
t (pt)+²t,
and that of selecting alternative B is 1 ¡ ¼
st
t (pt). Thus given agent t's signal, the probability of
choosing A is given by12








and B is chosen with complementary probability P(ct = BjHt;st) = 1¡P(ct = AjHt;st). When
¸ ! 1 choices are fully rational in the sense that they do not depend on the private realizations
²t and are determined solely by beliefs about the correct alternative. It is easy to show that
the logit QRE converges to the pure cascade Nash equilibrium in which indi®erent subjects
randomize uniformly.13 On the other hand, as ¸ approaches 0 choices are independent of beliefs
and become purely random.
The belief dynamics also depend on ¸. To derive the evolution of the public belief that A
is correct, note that given pt there are exactly two values that pt+1 = P(! = AjHt;ct) can take




t respectively. The computation




t given pt is carried out by agents who do not know the true
state, and so cannot condition their beliefs on that event. In contrast, the transition probabilities




t (i.e., of a choice for A or B) depend on the objective probabilities of a
and b signals as dictated by the true state. Thus when computing these transition probabilities,




t = P(ct = AjHt;! = A)
= P(ct = AjHt;st = a)P(st = aj! = A) + P(ct = AjHt;st = b)P(st = bj! = A)
=
q




1 + exp(¸(1 ¡ 2¼b
t(pt)))
;
11In general, the distributions of payo® disturbances in a logit QRE need not be the same for every decision
maker, but these distributional di®erences would be assumed to be common knowledge.
12Note that indi®erence occurs with probability zero under the logit speci¯cation, and hence plays no role.
13This is because for any ¸ 2 (0;1), an agent chooses equi-probably when indi®erent.
7with the probability of a B choice given by 1 ¡ T ! =A
t . Similarly, conditional on ! = B, the









1 + exp(¸(1 ¡ 2¼b
t(pt)))
:
Using Bayes' rule, we now obtain the two values that pt+1 may take as
p
+










t ´ P(! = AjHt;ct = B) =
pt(1 ¡ T ! =A
t )
pt(1 ¡ T ! =A
t ) + (1 ¡ pt)(1 ¡ T ! =B
t )
: (2.5)
These expressions can be used to derive the following properties of the belief dynamics (see
Appendix A for proofs), where without loss of generality we assume the true state is ! = A.
Proposition 1. For all ¸ > 0 there is a unique logit QRE with the following properties:
(i) Beliefs are interior: pt 2 (0;1) for all t 2 T .
(ii) Actions are informative: p
¡
t < pt < p
+
t for all t 2 T .
(iii) Beliefs about the true state rise on average: E(pt+1jpt;! = A) > pt for all t;t + 1 2 T .
(iv) Beliefs converge to the truth: conditional on ! = A, limt!1 pt = 1 almost surely.
2.3. Classi¯cation of Cascades Observed in the Laboratory
We distinguish several kinds of cascade-like behavior.14 A pure A (B) cascade is said to form
at time t · T if after period t ¡ 1 the number of A (B) choices exceed the number of B (A)
choices by 2 for the ¯rst time, and all choices from t to T are A (B) choices. Thus, for example,
if T = 6 and the sequence of choices is fA;B;A;A;A;Ag, then we say a pure A cascade forms
at t = 5. In periods 5 and 6, we say the decision makers are in a pure A cascade. Note that any
pure cascade beginning at time t, will have length T ¡ t + 1.
14One might argue for using the term \herd" instead of cascade, since cascade refers to belief dynamics, while
\herds" refer to choice dynamics. In the context of quantal response equilibrium, this distinction is arti¯cial,
since neither herds nor cascades can last forever. All choices occur with positive probability at every point in
time, and learning never ceases.
8A temporary A (B) cascade or A (B) craze15 is said to form at time t · T if after period
t¡1 (but not after period t¡2) the number of theoretically informative A (B) choices16 exceed
the number of theoretically informative B (A) choices by 2 and some decision maker ¿, with
t · ¿ · T, makes a contrary choice.17 The number of periods decision makers follow the cascade,
¿ ¡ t, de¯nes its length. Thus in the sequence of decisions fA;A;Bg we say that an A cascade
of length zero occurs at t = 3.
Temporary cascades are particularly interesting because subsequent play of the game is o®
the Nash equilibrium path. Moreover, if the sequence is long enough it is possible for a new
cascade to form after a temporary cascade has broken. Following AH, we de¯ne a simple counting
procedure to classify sequences of decisions and determine whether a new cascade has formed.
This ad hoc counting rule roughly corresponds to Bayesian updating when the probability that
indi®erent subjects follow their signals equals the probability that subjects who break cascades
hold contrary signals.18 Under the counting rule, every A decision when not in a cascade
increases the count by 1 and every B decision when not in a cascade decreases the count by 1.
Recall that we enter the ¯rst cascade of a sequence when the count reaches 2 or ¡2. Then the
decisions during the cascade do not change the count, until there is an action that goes against
the cascade, which decreases the count to 1 if it was an A cascade or increases the count to ¡1
if it was a B cascade. The count continues to change in this way, until the count reaches either
2 or ¡2 again, and then we are in a new cascade, which we call a secondary cascade.
We distinguish three di®erent kinds of secondary cascades. One possibility is that actions
cascade on the same state as the previous cascade: a repeat cascade. The other possibility is
that the actions cascade on a di®erent state: a reverse cascade. A self-correcting cascade is a
cascade that reverses from the incorrect state to the correct state.
2.4. Hypotheses
A wide range of observable implications follow from the theoretical results about the logit
equilibrium in these dynamic games of incomplete information. We distinguish four categories of
hypotheses depending on their object: cascade length and frequency, self-correction of cascades,
15According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1980), a craze is de¯ned as a \great but often short-lived
enthusiasm for something."
16Choices made during a (temporary) cascade are called theoretically uninformative.
17These de¯nitions extend in a natural way to more complex environments.
18These conditions are closely approximated in our data, where we ¯nd 85% of indi®erent subjects go with
their signals and 84% of cascade breakers received contrary signals.
9e±ciency of decisions, and belief dynamics. Most of these hypotheses are in the form of the
comparative statics with respect to the two main treatment parameters, q and T.
Testable implications of the logit QRE. For all ¸ > 0 observed behavior in the unique logit
QRE will have the following properties:
1. Cascades: Frequency and length19
(C1) For any q and su±ciently large T, the probability of observing a pure cascade is decreasing
in T, converging to 0 in the limit. For any q and T > 2, the probability of observing a
temporary cascade is increasing in T, converging to 1 in the limit.
(C2) For any T, the probability of a pure cascade is increasing in q.
(C3) For any q, the expected number of cascades is increasing in T.
(C4) For su±ciently large T, the expected number of cascades is decreasing in q.
(C5) The probability that a cascade, which has already lasted k periods, will break in the next
period is decreasing in k.
(C6) For any q, the average length of cascades is increasing in T.
(C7) For any T, the average length of cascades is increasing q.
2. Self-Correction
(SC1) Incorrect cascades are shorter on average than correct cascades.
(SC2) Incorrect cascades are more likely to reverse than correct cascades (self-correction).
(SC3) Correct cascades are more likely to repeat than incorrect cascades.
(SC4) Later cascades are more likely to be correct than earlier ones.
(SC5) A decision maker with a contradictory signal is more likely to break a cascade than a
decision maker with a con¯rmatory signal.
19Several of these hypotheses are only sensible if T is su±ciently large. At least 2 periods are required for
any cascade to form, and at least 6 periods are required to observe a cascade and its reversal. For exam-
ple, fA;A;B;B;B;Bg is the shortest possible sequence for a reverse from an A cascade to a B cascade, and
fA;A;B;Ag is the shortest possible sequence for a repeated A cascade.
103. E±ciency: The probability of correct decisions
(E1) The ex ante (i.e., before decision maker t has drawn a private signal) probability of a
correct decision is increasing in t. An interim version of this statement is true, but only
conditional on receiving an incorrect signal.20
(E2) The probability of a correct decision is higher for a correct than for an incorrect signal.
(E3) The probability of a correct choice is increasing in q.
4. Beliefs: Informational E±ciency
(B1) For each q, on average the public belief on the true state is closer to 1 in the ¯nal period
of the T = 40 treatments than in the T = 20 treatments.
(B2) For each t, on average the public belief on the true state is closer to 1 in the q = 6=9
treatments than in the q = 5=9 treatments.
(B3) For all treatments, on average the public belief on the true state is increasing in t.
These hypotheses follow from a few basic properties implied either by QRE or by the informative
signal process itself. We list them below,21 and refer to them in the ensuing discussion that
explains the intuiton of the hypotheses. For any positive value of ¸:
1. There is a (positive) lower bound on the probability a decision maker chooses either deci-
sion, because payo®s are bounded. This lower bound is independent of beliefs.
2. The higher the public belief on a state, the greater the probability the decision maker will
choose the optimal action for that state.
3. If a decision maker breaks a cascade, he is much more likely to have a contradictory signal
than a con¯rmatory signal.
4. The higher is q, the more likely it is that any given cascade to be correct.
5. In a correct cascade, con¯rmatory signals are more likely than contradictory signals.
6. In an incorrect cascade, con¯rmatory signals are less likely than contradictory signals.
20It is not true conditional on receiving a correct signal. To see this, note that the interim probability of a
correct decision at time t = 1 with a correct signal approaches 1 as ¸ diverges as it is optimal to follow one's
signal. In later periods it is bounded away from 1 because of the probability of a cascade on the wrong state.
21The proofs are straightforward and are omitted.
117. When an action is taken at time t, the public belief on the corresponding state increases.
That change in public belief is an increasing function of q.
8. The higher the public belief on the true state, the higher the probability the decision maker
receives a signal favoring that state.
9. The expected change in beliefs in the true state from t to t + 1 is always positive.
Hypothesis (C1) (which applies to T > 2) follows from (1) which implies that the probability
a cascade breaks in any round is strictly positive. Hypothesis (C2) follows from (3),(4), and (5).
Hypothesis (C3) follows because the probability a ¯rst cascade has formed is increasing in T,
the probability a cascade has formed and broken is increasing in T, the probability a cascade
has formed and broken, and then another one has formed is increasing in T and so forth.
Hypothesis (C4) is more complicated, and can only be proved for T su±ciently large. For
example, if T = 2, then the expected number of cascades is simply the probability that exactly
one cascade occurs, which is the probability of two either correct or two incorrect signals, which
is q2 + (1 ¡ q)2. This expression is increasing in q. The di±culty is that there are two opposing
e®ects of increasing q. The probability of a cascade forming is increasing in q but the probability
of a cascade breaking is decreasing in q. For su±ciently large T the latter e®ect dominates
because decisions are more frequently in a cascade than not in a cascade. The higher is ¸, the
greater must be T for this to be true.
Hypothesis (C5) follows from (2) and (6). Hypotheses (C6) and (C7) follow from (2), (6),
and (8) and the fact that the probability of a cascade breaking once you are in a cascade is
decreasing in q. Hypothesis (SC1) follows from (3), (4) and (5). The logic behind the next two
hypotheses about self-correction, (SC2) and (SC3), is fairly obvious. They follow from (7) and
the fact that decision makers are more likely to receive correct than incorrect signals. Hypothesis
(SC4) is a consequence of the self-correction process, and follows from (2) and (8). Hypothesis
(SC5) is equivalent to (3).
The e±ciency hypotheses address the frequency of correct decisions. First, on average,
e±ciency will increase over time because expected public belief converges monotonically to the
true state (the ex ante part of E1). Second, decision makers who receive a correct signal are
obviously more likely to make the correct decision than decision makers with incorrect signals
(E2), but this di®erence will decline over time, because the public belief on the true state
converges to 1 (interim part of E1). Third, e±ciency should be positively a®ected by signal
informativeness in three ways. There is the direct e®ect that more good signals are received
12with a higher q, but there are two indirect e®ects as well: with more informative signals, social
learning is faster because actions are more informative, and conditional on being in a cascade,
the cascade is more likely to be correct.22 Because these three e®ects all go in the same direction,
there should be a di®erence in e±ciency in the di®erent q treatments.
All the C, SC, and E hypotheses are tested with simple direct tests on sample means. How-
ever, (C3), (C4), (C6), and (C7) can be strengthened because the comparative statics results on
length and frequency of cascades holds for the entire distribution of lengths and frequencies, not
just the means.
Because beliefs, unlike actions, are not directly observable, we test the B hypotheses by
estimating beliefs using our QRE structural estimation approach. Because the analysis of beliefs
in our data quite di®erent and depend on the estimation, we discuss the results about beliefs
later, after presenting the QRE estimates of the underlying parameters of the model.
While some of these properties are also true for the initial few decisions in the pure cascade
Nash equilibrium, the e®ects vanish quickly with longer sequences. An exception is (E3). In
the perfect Nash equilibrium, the probability of a correct decision is approximately equal to the
probability of ending up in a correct cascade, which quickly approaches q2=(q2 + (1 ¡ q)2) and
rises with q.
3. Experimental Design
The two innovations of our experimental design are the use of much longer choice sequences
and the use of di®erent signal precisions. These innovations allow us to assess the predictions of
the logit QRE model in ways that are not possible with past designs, and to gain insights into
how the basic models might be improved.
The experiments reported here were conducted at the Social Sciences Experimental Labora-
tory (SSEL) at Caltech and the California Social Sciences Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL)
at UCLA between September 2002 and May 2003. The subjects included students from these
two institutions who had not previously participated in a cascade experiment.23
The experiments employ a 2£2 design, where we use two values of both the signal quality q
and the number of individuals T. Speci¯cally, q takes values 5=9 and 6=9, and T takes values 20
22Another minor e®ect going in the same direction is that with a higher q the posterior beliefs are, on average,
further from 1
2, so the expected payo® di®erence between a correct and incorrect action is generally increasing
in q.
23There was one subject who had previously participated in a related pilot experiment.
13Session T q M Subject Pool
03/14/03A 20 5/9 30 Caltech
09/26/02B 20 5/9 30 Caltech
09/19/02A 20 5/9 26 Caltech
04/03/03AB 20 5/9 30 UCLA
04/14/03A 20 6/9 30 UCLA
04/14/03C 20 6/9 30 UCLA
04/14/03E 20 6/9 30 UCLA
05/05/03D 40 5/9 17 UCLA
05/05/03F 40 5/9 19 UCLA
05/05/03G 40 5/9 20 UCLA
04/16/03B 40 6/9 20 UCLA
04/21/03C 40 6/9 20 UCLA
04/21/03E 40 6/9 20 UCLA
Table 3. Experimental sessions.
and 40. The number of games in each experimental session is denoted M. Table 3 summarizes
the design.24
In each session, a randomly chosen subject was selected to be the \monitor" and the remaining
subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals in the laboratory. All interaction among
subjects took place through the computers; no other communication was permitted. Instructions
were given with a voiced-over Powerpoint presentation in order to minimize variations across
sessions.25 After logging in, the subjects were taken slowly through a practice match (for which
they were not paid) in order to illustrate how the software worked, and to give them a chance
to become familiar with the process before the paid portion of the experiment commenced.
Before each match, the computer screen displayed two urns. For the q = 5=9 treatment,
one urn contained 5 blue balls and 4 red balls and the other contained 4 blue balls and 5 red
balls. For the q = 6=9 treatment, one urn contained 6 blue balls and 3 red balls and the
other contained 3 blue balls and 6 red balls. The monitor was responsible for rolling a die
at the beginning of each game to randomly choose one of the urns with equal probabilities.
24The design is not balanced with respect to subject pool because Caltech's laboratory has a maximum capacity
of 32 subjects. In the estimations reported below we checked for subject pool e®ects but found no major di®erences
in parameter estimates.
25See www.hss.caltech.edu/erogers/exp/ for the instructions.
14This process, and the instructions to the monitor (but not the outcome of the roll) were done
publicly. At this point, the subjects saw only one urn on the computer screen, with all nine
balls colored gray, so that they could not tell which urn had been selected. Each subject then
independently selected one ball from the urn on their screen to have its color revealed. Then, in
a random sequence, subjects sequentially guessed an urn. During this process, each guess was
displayed on all subjects' screens in real time as it was made, so each subject knew the exact
sequence of guesses of all previous subjects. After all subjects had made a choice, the correct
urn was revealed and subjects recorded their payo®s accordingly. Subjects were paid $1:00 for
each correct choice and $0:10 for each incorrect choice. Subjects were required to record all
this information on a record sheet, as it appeared on their screen. Due to time constraints, the
number of matches (sequences of T decisions) was M = 30 in each T = 20 session and M = 20 in
each T = 40 session.26 After the ¯nal game, payo®s from all games were summed and added to
a show-up payment, and subjects were then paid privately in cash before leaving the laboratory.
4. Results I: Cascades, Self-Correction, and E±ciency
In this section, we examine the aggregate properties of our data. The analysis is focused
by the hypotheses in the previous section about cascade frequency and length, self-correction of
cascades, and e±ciency of decisions.
4.1. Infrequency of Pure Cascades; Frequency of Temporary Cascades
In AH's experiment with only T = 6 decision makers, all cascades were necessarily very short.
In contrast, our experiments investigated sequences of T = 20 and T = 40 decision makers,
allowing for the ¯rst time an opportunity to observe long cascades, the length distribution of
temporary cascades, and the self-correcting property. As Table 4 clearly demonstrates, pure
cascades essentially do not happen in the longer matches. The cascades that persisted in the
AH experiments simply appear to be pure cascades, a likely artifact of the short horizon. Our
numbers are comparable to those of AH when we consider only the ¯rst six decision makers in
our sequences. These numbers are given in the row marked \First 6" in Table 4. In contrast, we
observe pure cascades in only 17 our of 206 sequences with T = 20 decision makers, and only 8
of 116 sequences with T = 40 decision makers.
26A few sessions contained fewer sequences due to technical problems, see Table 3.
15Table 4. Percentages of pure cascades by treatment.
Table 5. Percentages of temporary cascades by treatment.
The ¯nal columns of Table 4 give the predicted frequency of pure cascades according to the
Nash equilibrium (and out of sample predictions from the QRE-BRF model, which we explain
and discuss in a later section). The Nash equilibrium probability of a pure cascade with T
decision makers is 1 ¡ (q(1 ¡ q))T=2.
The data contradict the Nash predictions in three ways. First, there are far fewer pure cas-
cades than theory predicts. Second, there were far fewer than were observed in past experiments
with very short decision sequences. According to theory, the frequency of pure cascades should
increase with T but in fact the data show the opposite. Third, the frequency of pure cascades
in the data is steeply increasing in q, while the Nash equilibrium predicts almost no e®ect. In
our data, pure cascades occurred nearly ¯ve times as often in the q = 6=9 treatment than when
q = 5=9 (20=150 compared to 5=172).27
In contrast to pure cascades, temporary cascades are common in all treatments. Table 5
27Further evidence indicates this continues to increase with q. In a single additional session with q = 3=4 and
T = 20, we observed pure cascades in 28=30 sequences.
16Table 6. Number and lengths of cascades by treatment.
shows the frequency of temporary cascades in our data. The rows and columns mirror Table
4, but the entries now indicate the proportion of sequences in a given treatment that exhibit
at least one temporary cascade that falls apart. Clearly, for large T, essentially all cascades we
observe are temporary. With the short horizon of the AH experiment, temporary cascades occur
only in about one-fourth of the sequences.
4.2. Number and Lengths of Temporary cascades
With larger T, we almost always observe multiple temporary cascades along a single se-
quence. Table 6 (top) displays the average number of cascades in each treatment. The number
of temporary cascades rises with the sequence length, T, and falls with the signal precision,
q, not only on average, but also in the sense of ¯rst order stochastic dominance, see the top
panel of Figure 1. This evidence supports hypotheses (C3) and (C4). The table and the ¯gure
also show the Nash prediction of exactly 1 cascade per sequence, independent of q and T, and
out-of-sample predictions generated by the QRE-BRF model (discussed later).
Figure ?? graphs separately for each treatment, the empirical probability of collapse as a
function of the duration of the cascade: i.e., the probability of a collapse in period t + s, given
the cascade started in period t. This probability is sharply decreasing in s. In other words,
longer cascades are more stable (KÄ ubler and WeizsÄ acker, 2005), which is predicted by QRE but
is not true in the Nash equilibrium. This ¯nding supports hypothesis (C5).
The average length of temporary cascades for each treatment is displayed in Table 6 (bottom),
and the complete distributions of length are shown in Figure 1 (bottom).28 Average length of
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Figure 1: The left panels depict the observed distributions of the number of cascades
(top) and of cascade lengths (bottom), color coded by treatment: dark (light) gray
lines correspond to q = 5=9 (q = 6=9) and they are solid (broken) for T = 40
(T = 20). The right panels show predictions of the Nash and QRE-BRF models.
In the top right panel, the solid line that jumps to 100% at 1 corresponds to Nash
predictions and the other lines the QRE-BRF predictions. In the bottom right panel,

































Figure 2: Chance of cascade breaking as a function of cascade length.
The lines show 5-period moving averages of the probability of a break
in each of the treatments (color coded as in Figure 1).
temporary cascades rises with the sequence length, T when q = 6=9 but not when q = 5=9,
with the di®erence insigni¯cant at the 5% level in the latter case. Average length also rises with
the signal precision, q, for both T = 20 and T = 40. Thus we ¯nd strong support for (C7)
but only weak support for (C6). A comparison of the entire distribution of lengths is given in
the top panel of Figure 1. The table and the ¯gure also show the Nash prediction of exactly 1
cascade per sequence, independent of q and T, and out-of-sample predictions generated by the
QRE-BRF model (discussed later).
4.3. O®-the-Equilibrium-Path Behavior
Given that the vast majority (92%) of cascades are temporary and short in duration, and
nearly all (90%) sequences in our data exhibit multiple cascades, an immediate conclusion is that
number of choices. For t even, the probability a cascade forms after t + 2 choices conditional on one not having
yet formed after t choices is 1¡2¯q(1¡q), where ¯ is the probability an indi®erent subject follows her signal. In
the data, ¯ = 0:85. Since upon forming, a cascade persists through period T, the predicted length distributions
of temporary cascades can be calculated easily.
19there are many choices o® the (Nash) equilibrium path. Table 2 in the Introduction characterizes
a subset of these choices for the di®erent treatments as a function of the deviating decision
maker's signal. The table shows the behavior of what we call cascade breakers, since these are
all terminal decisions of a temporary cascade.
Over all treatments, cascades were broken a total of 1081 times. These contrary actions were
¯ve times more likely to be taken by subjects with contradictory signals than with con¯rmatory
signals (898 compared with 183). In fact, if we compare the rates of breaking cascades for
decision makers with contradictory versus con¯rmatory signals, there di®erence is even starker
(37% compared to 6%). This supports hypothesis (SC5).
The behavior of decision makers immediately following a cascade breaker also plays a critical
role in the dynamics. Because the ¯rst break is so informative, a second break moves beliefs
close to :5, essentially eliminating the trend in beliefs that had developed during the cascade.
As expected, the probability of a second break by the next decision maker is sharply increased.
Approximately 75% of the decision makers immediately following a cascade break follow their
signals. A player who observes a signal consistent with the recent cascade of course should
rationally follow the cascade, a prediction that is borne out by our data: 90% of these decision
makers follow the action corresponding to the recently broken cascade. Only 10% are secondary
deviators who follow the recent break. Thus, they behave roughly the same as they would
have if the cascade had never been broken. Those who received contradictory signals behaved
much di®erently. Well over half (56%) of the decision makers with contradictory signals are
secondary deviators. Pooling over all treatments, they outnumber the secondary deviators with
con¯rmatory signals by a factor of ¯ve to one (277 compared to 58). Table 7 gives a complete
breakdown of the choices directly following a cascade break, by treatment.
The two key conclusions of this subsection are that play o® the equilibrium path occurs
frequently and is highly informative, setting the stage for self-correction. As a result, we will ¯nd
that the long run implications of the standard theory are completely contradicted by the data.
4.4. Repeated and Reversed Cascades: Self Correction
Since this o®-path behavior is central to the dynamic properties of QRE (where such behavior
is actually not o®-path) and to the resulting convergence of beliefs, our experimental design with
much longer sequences allows us to better observe the kinds of complex dynamics predicted by
the theory, in particular the phenomenon of self correction.
20T=20 T=40
Decision \ Signal Confirming Contrary Decision \ Signal Confirming Contrary
q=5/9 Confirming 42.8% 20.9% Confirming 45.4% 20.3%
Contrary 3.3% 33.0% Contrary 8.4% 25.9%
# obs = 306 # obs = 379
Decision \ Signal Confirming Contrary Decision \ Signal Confirming Contrary
q=6/9 Confirming 48.4% 14.7% Confirming 58.2% 26.7%
Contrary 6.3% 30.5% Contrary 2.4% 12.7%
# obs = 190 # obs = 165
Table 7. Percentages of choices con¯rming/contradicting the recent cascade after a break.
Table 8. Frequency of repeated and reversed cascades by treatment.
Table 8 shows the average number of repeated and reversed cascades per sequence, by treat-
ment, and also gives theoretical expectations according to the Nash and out-of-sample QRE-BRF
predictions (explained later). While such cascades are not possible in the Nash equilibrium, the
latter model predicts the observed number of reversed and repeated cascades remarkably well.
Table 9 shows how frequently correct and incorrect cascades repeat or reverse themselves.29
The number of repeat cascades is increasing in T and decreasing in q, which is consistent with
the QRE model.
Averaging over the four treatments shows that when a correct cascade breaks, it reverses to
an incorrect one in approximately 6% of all cases (39/637). In contrast, an incorrect cascade that
breaks leads to a self-corrected cascade in more than 21% of all cases (66/369). This con¯rms
29The percentages listed ignore terminal cascades, since they can neither repeat nor reverse, by de¯nition.
21T = 20 T = 40
From\To Correct Incorrect From\To Correct Incorrect
q = 5/9 Correct 92.7% 7.3% Correct 93.6% 6.4%
Incorrect 22.7% 77.3% Incorrect 11.0% 89.0%
# obs = # obs =
From\To Correct Incorrect From\To Correct Incorrect
q = 6/9 Correct 91.4% 8.6% Correct 98.7% 1.3%
Incorrect 30.5% 69.5% Incorrect 20.0% 80.0%
# obs = # obs =
Table 9. Transitions between correct and incorrect cascades in our data.
hypotheses (SC2) and (SC3).
Table 9 also lists the initial, ¯nal, and total number of correct and incorrect cascades by
treatment. In all four treatments, the fraction of incorrect cascades is always lower among the
¯nal cascades compared with the initial cascades. Overall, initial cascades were incorrect nearly
35% of the time (114/322) and ¯nal cascades were incorrect only 27% of the time (87/322). This
supports hypothesis (SC4).
4.5. E±ciency
How frequently are actions correct? How does this change over time? And how does this
change as a function of signal informativeness? These questions can be directly answered in our
data by checking the proportion of correct decisions, since both the state and the action of each
individual is observed in the data.
There are two important observations to note before delving into the analysis of the e±ciency
results. First, the probability of a correct decision, and the way that probability changes over
time, will be much di®erent for decision makers who received correct versus incorrect signals.
Decision makers with incorrect signals will do badly at the beginning, but will do increasingly
well over time. Decision makers with correct signals will do very well at the beginning (perfectly
in the Nash equilibrium), but will do worse for a while until the public belief gets close enough
to 1. Second, overall e±ciency is extremely sensitive to the speci¯c sequence of signals indi-
viduals receive, and also (in a quantal response equilibrium) the speci¯c action choices. Since
22in 20 rounds there are over one million possible signal sequences (and many more signal-action
sequences), our experimental data represent only a small fraction of the possible sequences.
Therefore, there is a lot of sample variation.
Figure ?? shows the time-dependence of decision accuracy, by treatment. The middle column
displays the actual data, averaged across all experimental sequences, with the four rows each
corresponding to a treatment: (q = 6=9, T = 20) top row, (q = 6=9, T = 40) second row,
(q = 5=9, T = 20) third row, and (q = 5=9, T = 40) bottom row. In each graph, the thick solid
black line shows the fraction of correct choices for all signals; the dashed (upper) and thinner
(lower) lines display the fraction of correct choices for correct and incorrect signals, respectively.
It is useful to contrast the data with the e±ciency predictions of Nash equilibrium, which
are displayed in the left column of the same graph, again based on the actual signal draws in the
experiment. In the Nash equilibrium, decision accuracy quickly becomes independent of signals,
re°ecting the formation of pure cascades where all learning stops and all future decisions are the
same.30 The decision accuracy for (in)correct signals (rises) falls for a few rounds and then levels
o®. As a result, the unconditional decision accuracy increases for only a short amount of time as
nearly all cascades are formed in the ¯rst ¯ve periods and never break. This contrasts sharply
with the dynamics in the actual data, where unconditional decision accuracy continues to rise
as the sequence of decision makers passes through cycles of temporary cascades that break and
re-form.
There is a strong signal dependence that persists throughout the experiment. The decision
accuracy for incorrect signals is always less than for correct signals in the actual data in every
round t, providing strong support for (E2). For incorrect signals, there is a clear and persistent
upward trend in decision accuracy (due to information aggregation)and there is a small, early
downward trend for decision makers with correct signals, as hypothesized (the interim part of
E1). For decision makers with correct signals this levels o® and even reverses sign later, because
later cascades are more likely to be correct due to the phenomenon of self-correction.
For a more formal statistical test of hypotheses E1-E3, Table 11 shows the results of a Probit
regression with six independent explanatory variables: t, q, q¤t, signal, signal¤t, match. Signal
is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the signal is correct. The variable q ¤ t is
an interaction of signal informativeness and time period,31 which, according to hypothesis H4,
30As an illustration of the sample variation induced by the speci¯c sequence of signal draws, decision makers in
the q = 5=9, T = 20 treatment by chance drew many more correct signals in the early rounds than did decision
makers in the q = 5=9, T = 40 treatment. This is most easily seen by comparing the Nash predictions of decision
accuracy for the two treatments.
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Figure 3: Decision accuracy along the sequence of decision makers by treatment: (q = 6=9,
T = 20) top row, (q = 6=9, T = 40) second row, (q = 5=9, T = 20) third row, and
(q = 5=9, T = 40) bottom row. In each graph, the thick solid black line shows the fraction of
correct choices for all signals, the dashed red line for correct signals, and the thin blue line
for incorrect signals. The lines show moving averages: a point at time t represents average
decision accuracy between t ¡ 2 and t + 2 for 3 · t · T ¡ 2. The left column gives Nash
predictions, the middle column data, and the right column QRE-BRF simulations, all based
on the actual signals used in the experiment.
24Constant -1.57 (0.30) -2.58 (0.33) -3.27 (0.32)
q 1.26 (0.51) 2.52 (0.55) 4.51 (0.53)
t 0.021 (0.0025) 0.033 (0.0026) 0.019 (0.0025)
q * t 0.017 (0.0029) 0.016 (0.0031) 0.012 (0.0031)
signal * t -0.037 (0.0029) -0.049 (0.0031) -0.027 (0.0030)
signal 1.76 (0.055) 2.23 (0.059) 1.71 (0.057)
match 0.0047 (0.0021) 0.0077 (0.0022) -0.0015 (0.0006)
# obs 8760 8760 8760
logL -4620 -4021 -4178
Dependent Variable 
Correct Choice
Data Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Table 10. Probit estimation of the e®ects of q and t on e±ciency.
should be positive. The variable (signal¤t) is an interaction between time and signal correctness.
From hypothesis H1, the e®ect of t on decision accuracy should be positive only for incorrect
signals, with a possible small negative e®ect for correct signals. Match is a variable that is
included to control for possible experience e®ects.32 Notice that we do not include T in the
regression, because the theory does not predict any e®ect except through the variable t.
The second column of Table 11 shows the estimated coe±cients with standard errors in
parentheses. All coe±cients have the expected sign and are statistically signi¯cant. These
results deserve closer inspection for at least two reasons. First, the regression is not based on
any kind of structural model of decision making. Second, there are obvious dependencies in the
data, and un-modelled sources of error, including quantal response errors and variation in signal
sequences. (The third and fourth columns of the table are discussed later.)
Finally, it is natural to ask whether e±ciency is higher under the QRE-BRF model than
it is under the standard Nash model. Information is aggregated better under QRE-BRF (see
Proposition 1) but decision-making is worse in this case as subjects are prone to errors. Figure
5 shows that e±ciency levels are increasing with time under the QRE-BRF model throughout
the duration of the experiment. In fact, in the long run as T grows large, beliefs in the QRE-
BRF model converge to the true state so that private beliefs and public coincide, independent
of signals. Using the pooled data to estimate the parameters of the QRE-BRF model, we can
compute the asymptotic decision accuracy: 0.99, i.e. almost full allocative e±ciency is achieved
32Match=1 corresponds to the ¯rst sequence in a session, and ranges up to 20 or 30 depending on whether T
equals 40 or 20, respectively.
25in this limit.
4.6. Summary of Results
Here we summarize our ¯ndings by relating them to the properties of the logit QRE discussed
in section 2.3.
² (C1) and (C2): The occurrence of pure cascades decreases with T and increases with q. The
e®ect of T is obvious from comparing the di®erent rows in Table 4. Both for q = 5=9 and
q = 6=9, the percentages of pure cascades fall quickly with each successive row. Comparing
columns 1 and 3 and columns 2 and 4 in Table 4 shows the e®ect of signal informativeness.
² (C3 and C4): The number of cascades increases with T and decreases with q. See Table
6 and Figure 1. Longer sequences have more cascades because they allow for more cycles
of formation and collapse. These e®ects are barely noticeable in short sequences: AH's
experiment averaged slightly more than 1 cascade per sequence.
² (C5): The probability of collapse sharply decreases as a function of the duration of the
cascade. See Figure ??.
² (C6 and C7): Cascades lengths increase with T for q = 6=9 and increase with q. The
e®ect of T can be decomposed as follows. First, and most obvious, if T is short then
some cascades that would have lasted longer are interrupted at T. Second, by (C5) longer
cascades are less likely to break. The two e®ects combined result in a fat tail of the length
distribution and in a mass of cascades at T ¡ 2, see Table 6 and Figure 1. The e®ect of T
is observed in the q = 5=9 data, where the distributions of cascade lengths are very similar
for the T = 20 and T = 40 treatments.
² (SC1): Correct cascades last longer on average. The observed average lengths of (correct,
incorrect) cascades in the di®erent treatments are: (2.55, 2.24) for q = 5=9 and T = 20,
(2.08, 1.91) for q = 5=9 and T = 40 , (3.42, 2.85) for q = 6=9 and T = 20, and (8.31, 5.50)
for q = 6=9 and T = 40.
² (SC2) and (SC3): Reverse cascades are usually self-correcting, and repeat cascades are
usually correct. See Table 9. Across the four treatments, the probability that a reversed
cascade is self-correcting is 63% (even though there are many more correct than incor-
rect cascades to reverse from). It is this feature of the dynamics that produces the full
information aggregation result of Proposition 1.
26² (SC4): Later cascades are correct more frequently than earlier ones. See Table 9, which
lists the number of (in)correct cascades among initial and ¯nal cascades.
² (SC5): Cascades are almost always broken by decision makers with contradictory signals.
See Table 2.
² (E1): Ex ante e±ciency is increasing in t. E±ciency is increasing in t, conditional on an
incorrect signal. E±ciency is initially decreasing in t conditional on a correct signal, but
this eventually reverses (see Figure 3).
² (E2): Correct signals lead to more e±cient decisions than do incorrect signals. Again, see
Figure 3.
² (E3): More informative signals lead to more e±cient decisions. See Figure 2 and Table
10.
The ¯nal three hypotheses, (B1)-(B3) address the evolution of beliefs during a sequence and are
discussed in section 6. The next section describes the QRE estimation and our base rate fallacy
model.
5. Results II: Estimation
We start by describing the estimation procedure for the basic logit QRE model. The only
parameter is the slope of the logit response curve, which in the context of these games can be
interpreted as a proxy for rationality, experience, and task performance skill. In subsequent
subsections, we jointly estimate logit and other parameters, using standard maximum likelihood
estimation. For comparability, we choose to normalize payo®s in all experiments to equal 1 if a
subject guesses the state correctly and 0 otherwise.33
Since subjects' choice behavior depends on ¸, public beliefs follows a stochastic process that
depends on ¸. The evolution of the public belief can be solved recursively (see equations (??) and
(??)), so implicitly we can write pt(c1;¢¢¢;ct¡1j¸). Given f¸;st;(c1;¢¢¢;ct¡1)g, the probability
of observing player t choose A is:
P(ct = Aj¸;st;c1;¢¢¢;ct¡1) =
1




33Recall that in the experiment subjects received $1 for a correct choice and $0.10 for an incorrect choice. The
di®erence of $0.9 is normalized to 1 unit in the estimations. Without this normalization the estimates reported
below would be multiplied by a factor of 1=:9.
27and P(ct = Bj¸;st;c1;¢¢¢;ct¡1) = 1¡P(ct = Aj¸;st;c1;¢¢¢;ct¡1). Therefore, the likelihood of a














The estimation results for the logit QRE model are given in Table 11 of Appendix B, which
also contains a detailed estimation program written in GAUSS. The ¸ estimates for the four
treatments are quite stable and the pooled estimate is close to that estimated from the AH data.
Notice that the estimated value of ¸ for the (q = 5=9, T = 20) treatment is somewhat greater
than the other three treatments. This may re°ect a subject pool e®ect, since that treatment
was the only one that used mostly Caltech students.
Since comparison with Nash equilibium does not provide a particularly informative bench-
mark for the logit QRE, the following three subsections consider extensions and alternatives to
the basic model. This allows us to access the extent to which the choice behavior in our data
is explained by quantal response type decision errors as opposed to other sources, such as non-
Bayesian updating and non-rational expectations.34 Using parametric speci¯cations we measure
the extent of certain types of these biases in the data.
5.1. Incorporating the Base Rate Fallacy
In their seminal article, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) present experimental evidence show-
ing that individuals' behavior is often at odds with Bayesian updating. As noted in the intro-
duction, there is considerable evidence in the literature on cascade experiments that players are
non-Bayesian. We explore two of these here. First, a particularly prevalent judgement bias is
the Base Rate Fallacy (BRF), or as Camerer (1995, pp. 597-601) more accurately calls it, \base
rate neglect." In the context of our social learning model, the base rate fallacy would imply that
agents weight the public prior too little relative to their own signal. Because past experiments
have been suggestive of these e®ects, we construct an analytical model of this and estimate it
34Huck and Oechssler (2000) ¯nd strong evidence of violationg of Bayesian updating in a similar context.
28using the error structure of the Logit equilbrium.35 We formalize this idea as a non-Bayesian
updating process in which the private signal is counted by the decision maker as ® signals, where
® 2 (0;1).36 Rational agents correspond to ® = 1, while agents have progressively more severe
base-rate fallacies as ® increases above 1.37
While agents over-weight their private signals we retain the assumption that they have ratio-
nal expectations about others' behavior. This implicitly assumes that ® is common knowledge











(1 ¡ q)® pt
(1 ¡ q)® pt + q®(1 ¡ pt)
(5.2)
respectively.38
The public belief, pt, in equations (5.1) and (5.2) is derived recursively using (2.3)-(2.5). In
particular, this means that subjects not only overweight signals, but also take into account that
other subjects overweight signals too, and the public belief is updated accordingly. Thus, for
® > 1, the public belief is updated more quickly than in the pure Bayesian model.
There is good reason to think this model may better describe some features of the data.
First, when ® = 1 QRE predicts that indi®erent agents randomize uniformly. However in the
data 85% of indi®erent subjects follow their signals, which is consistent with ® > 1.39 Second,
when ® > 1, cascades take longer to start.40 The base rate fallacy therefore provides one possible
explanation for the prevalence of length zero temporary cascades in our data set (see Figure 1).
The estimation results for the QRE-BRF model are reported in the second panel of Table
11. For all treatments, the BRF parameter, ®, is signi¯cantly greater than 1.41 To test for
35Some error structure is required for the estimation because the ® -BRF model is deterministic.
36This could also be loosely interpreted as a parametric model of \overcon¯dence" bias in the sense of Gri±n
and Tversky (1992). Kariv (2005) and NÄ oth and Weber (2003) use this terminology.
37Values of ® < 1 correspond to under-weighting the signal, or \conservatism" bias, as discussed in Edwards
(1968) and Camerer (1995, pp. 601-2). Although this latter kind of bias has less support in the experimental
literature, it is su±ciently plausible that we choose not to assume it away.
38From these equations, it is easy to see that for ® > 1 the learning process is faster as agents' choices depend
more on their own signals, in the sense that the expected change in posterior is greater.
39A subject is indi®erent when the counting rule applied to previous decisions and the subject's private signal
balances to zero.
40For example, after two A choices the third decision maker need not choose A if she su±ciently overweighs
her b signal.
41Similar results are reported by C »elen and Kariv (2004).
29signi¯cance we can simply compare the loglikelihood of the QRE-BRF model to that of the
constrained model (with ® = 1) in the top panel. Obviously, the BRF parameter is highly
signi¯cant.42 Furthermore, the constrained model yields a signi¯cantly (at the 0:01 level) higher
estimate of ¸ for all treatments.
There is at least one alternative interpretation to the ¯nding that subjects respond too
strongly to their signal. By doing so, they are giving better information to later decision mak-
ers, which increases e±ciency and raises the expected utility of the other players in the game.
Evidence from experiments on public goods and some game theory experiments suggest some
degree of altruism by subjects. Conceivably, what we are calling a base rate neglect (or over-
weighting of signals) may simply be a manifestation of altruistic behavior. However, there is
some counter evidence that suggests this is probably not the case. First, if altruism is the mo-
tivating force, one would expect higher estimates of ® for T = 40 than for T = 20. This is not
the case. Second, once would expect less overweighting of signals in later periods than in earlier
periods. We tested for this and found no signi¯cant e®ect. Therefore, our interpretation is not
that subjects are behaving altruistically, but rather the source of the distortion is a probability
judgement fallacy.
5.2. Incorporating Non-Rational Expectations
Rather than simply over-weighting private information relative to the base rate (public be-
lief), it is possible that players update incorrectly because they do not have rational expectations
about the driving parameters of the model. The QRE model implicitly assumes that ¸ is con-
stant across the population and common knowledge. In particular, if players believed other
players' ¸ were lower than it truly was, then beliefs, and hence choice dynamics, would be quali-
tatively similar to those under a base rate neglect. The reason is that when choices are believed
to be generated by a noisier process, players draw weaker inferences about predecessors' signals
from observing their choices. Accordingly, we consider a model that allows for separate belief
and action precision parameters, as proposed by WeizsÄ acker (2003). These di®erent parameters
are labelled ¸a (action lambda) and ¸b (belief lambda). That is, players choice probabilities
follow the logit choice function with parameter ¸a but they believe that other players' choice
probabilities follow a logit choice function with parameter ¸b.43 We call this the non-rational
42For the pooled data the di®erence in loglikelihoods is nearly 200. A simple t-test also rejects the hypothesis
that ® = 1, with a t -statistic of 14.6. Tests conducted for the AH data also reject the constrained model, with
a slightly lower estimate of ®.
43See KÄ ubler and WeizsÄ acker (2004) for a more extensive discussion of this model.
30expectations model, or QRNE model.
The estimation results for the QRNE model are also given in Table 11. While this two-
parameter model performs signi¯cantly better than the QRE model, the increase in likelihood
is smaller in magnitude than the increase of QRE-BRF relative to the simple QRE.
An advantage of using the QRE model is that we can explore the relative importance of
di®erent biases, by nesting them in the same model. In this case we can see whether the
BRF bias is more or less important in our data compared to updating failures due to irrational
expectations about other players' error probabilities. When BRF and QRNE are combined so
that the model includes both sources of bias, the action and belief ¸ are virtually identical when
estimated from the pooled data, and the increase in likelihood from the QRE-BRF model is
barely signi¯cant. A similar conclusion holds for the AH data, indicating that the assumption of
rational expectations (¸a = ¸b) is (approximately) valid in both data sets, while ® > 1 indicates
a robust e®ect of base rate neglect.
5.3. An Alternative Model: Cognitive Heterogeneity
It is instructive to consider other models with non-quantal response sources of noise which
could also potentially explain our data. This helps to check the validity of our basic story for
choice behavior, in light of the observation that the Nash equilibrium does not provide a way
to challenge any of the predictions of QRE. One natural question to ask is where the source
of scatter (error) in our data is really coming from. In QRE, it is assume to come entirely
from payo®-monotone choice errors, and this behavior is assumed to be homogeneous across the
population. An alternative possibility is that this apparent noise in the data is due to some kind
of underlying heterogeneity. We explore one possible model of heterogeneity in this section.
Although there are many options, a natural ¯rst step is to suppose that some players behave
completely randomly, while other players optimize against such behavior. Camerer, Ho, and
Chong (2003) extend this idea to allow for multiple levels of sophistication.44 Speci¯cally, level
0 players are random, and all other players use optimal strategies given their beliefs. Level 1
players believe all the other players are level 0, level 2 players believe all others are a mixture
of level 0 and level 1, and so forth. The proportion of level k players in the population is given
by a Poisson distribution with parameter ¿. That is, the probability of a level k player in the
44Stahl and Wilson (1995) explored a related but di®erent model with levels of sophistication to study behavior
in experimental games. See Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2003) for a discussion of the di®erences between the two
models.
31population, given the Poisson parameter ¿ is equal to ¿ke¿
k! . Thus, for example, if ¿ = 1:5 then the
distribution of types 0;1;2;3;::: is equal to (0:22;0:33;0:25;0:125;:::). Players are assumed to
have truncated rational expectations, i.e. level k players believe all other players are a mixture
of levels less than k, with their relative probabilities given by the true Poisson distribution.
Thus, again using the example of ¿ = 1:5, 22% of the players are simply randomizing, 33% are
optimizing assuming they face only rational players, 25% are optimizing assuming they face a
mixture of level 0 and level 1 in proportions equal to 2
5 and 3
5, and so forth. Therefore, assuming
the model is correct, very high level types have very accurate beliefs about the distribution of
types. This implies they also have accurate beliefs about the distribution of strategies in the
population, and therefore they are almost optimizing. This is called the cognitive hierarchy (CH)
model.
The presence of randomizing level 0 players will lead higher-level players to implicitly discount
the information contained in the choices of their predecessors. In this way the CH model can
pick up some of the same features of the data as QRE. To see this, it is instructive to look at
exactly what the behavior of the lowest three types are. Level 0's of course are just random.
Level 1's simply follow their own signal, since they assume there is no useful information in the
observations of previous decision makers (they are believed to be totally random). Level 2's
optimize against a mixture of such players, so they simply act as if each previous decision is a
noisy (but informative) signal about the signals of earlier decision makmers. Again using the
example of ¿ = 1:5, if the second mover is a level 2 player and observed the ¯rst player choose
A choices, they believe that the ¯rst mover received an A signal with probability 4
5 and a B
signal with probability 1
5. Thus, such a player's posterior on state A will be less than q. That is,
level 2's have dampened updating, but also note that level 2's will reach a point quickly where
they no longer follow their own signal. In the example above, they will act exactly like a player
following the Nash equilibrium, and will herd after one of the decisions has been chosen two
more times than the other decision. (This is independent of q.) Furthermore, like QRE, CH is
\complete" in the sense that it is consistent with any sequence of choices and signals. Hence we
can obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter ¿ via the same methodology, without
using QRE, see Table 11.
We also estimate CH together with QRE to allow for further comparison with QRE. To do
so, we suppose that each agent is assigned a level k in the hierarchy, as in CH, but quantal
responds to her beliefs, as in QRE. Thus CH-QRE is a model parameterized by (¿;¸), which
are assumed to be common knowledge. All three models (CH, QRE, and CH-QRE) are then
re-estimated with the inclusion of the BRF parameter ®, to allow for the possibility of over-
32or under-weighting of private information in each case, see Table 11. Note that the estimates
for the combined QRE-BRF-CH model are stable across data sets and generally result in the
highest likelihood. All three are signi¯cant factors, based on likelihood ratio tests, and leaving
out any one of these factors changes the magnitudes of the other estimates.
A surprising ¯nding is that the estimate for ¿ is larger in magnitude than has been typically
found in other settings. Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) report estimates in the range of 1:5
to 2:5, while our estimate in the combined model is 2:9 (with a standard error of 0.10). This
appears to be due to an interaction between ¿, ¸, and ®. The estimate of ¿ in the pure CH
model is 1:9, and its estimate in the CH-QRE model (without BRF) is 2:5. Combining QRE
and CH also leads to substantially larger estimates of ¸. The reason for this is that both are
rationality parameters that substitute for each other. The 0 types in the CH model absorb a lot
of the randomness in the QRE model. In other words, the random behavior that can only be
explained by 0 types in the CH model is also explained by quantal response randomness. Hence
we ¯nd relatively low values of either parameter if the models are estimated separately, but both
increase signi¯cantly when the models are combined.
5.4. Implications of Estimates for the Data
The QRE-BRF model is simple and intuitively appealing and we use it to create simulated
data for comparisons with the actual data.45 For each of the four treatments, we used the data
from the other three treatments to obtain out-of-sample estimates for ¸ and ®. We then ap-
plied the out-of-sample estimates to the signals realized in the experiment to obtain simulated
choices for the treatment. Based on this simulated data set we computed descriptive statistics
about the numbers, lengths and types of cascades: pure and temporary, repeated and reversed,
self-correcting, etc. These are reported in the right two columns of Tables 4 and 5 (pure and tem-
porary cascades, respectively), and the second and ¯fth rows of Tables 6 and 8 (numbers/lengths
of cascades and reversals, respectively). Because the simulations were constructed using out-
of-sample estimates of ¸ and ®, they represent out of sample predictions of the properties of
cascades in our data, which makes a comparison to the actual data meaningful. Indeed, the
match with the actual data is quite remarkable.
We are also able to construct out-of-sample simulated e±ciency dynamics in the the same
way for each of the four treatments, again using the actual sample draws. These are displayed
45The QRE-CH-BRF model would have been an alternative model for simulation, but the additional random-
ness of 0-level types would have necessitated many more simulated sequences. Because the ¯t improvement over
QRE-BRF is negligible, we decided to use the simpler QRE-BRF model for our simulations.
33Our Data AH Data
p = 5/9 p = 6/9 p = 6/9
T = 20 T = 40 T = 20 T = 40 T = 6
# obs 2320 2240 1800 2400 8760 270
QRE
λ 11.36 (0.42) 7.19 (0.32) 4.38 (0.18) 4.69 (0.19) 6.12 (0.14) 6.62 (0.72)
logL  981.0  1181.4  682.0  634.0  3650.3  79.0
QRE-BRF
α 2.33 (0.18) 2.97 (0.36) 2.01 (0.16) 1.67 (0.16) 2.46 (0.10) 1.51 (0.19)
λ 7.07 (0.45) 3.68 (0.32) 3.47 (0.16) 4.09 (0.18) 4.23 (0.11) 5.90 (0.76)
logL  930.7  1147.6  653.0  622.5  3466.0  74.5
QRNE
λA 14.45 (0.62) 9.82 (0.49) 5.16 (0.23) 4.74 (0.18) 6.32 (0.14) 7.93 (0.92)
λB 4.07 (0.37) 1.86 (0.18) 1.86 (0.18) 3.45 (0.33) 4.48 (0.28) 3.78 (0.66)
logL  947.7  1156.3  660.8  627.9  3636.6  74.7
QRNE-BRF
α 3.24 (0.34) 2.64 (0.41) 1.82 (0.24) 1.54 (0.16) 2.59 (0.12) 1.75 (0.23)
λA 5.43 (0.44) 4.06 (0.51) 3.65 (0.27) 4.19 (0.20) 4.09 (0.12) 5.35 (0.83)
λB 12.56 (1.87) 3.25 (0.47) 2.93 (0.52) 3.40 (0.34) 4.92 (0.33) 15.68 (10.58)
logL  925.6  1147.1  652.5  620.5  3462.8  73.3
CH
τ 1.67 (0.06) 1.24 (0.04) 1.96 (0.04) 2.82 (0.03) 1.91 (0.02) 2.20 (0.22)
logL  964.0  1180.4  694.3  656.6  3648.1  77.1
QRE-CH
τ 2.00 (0.11) 1.67 (0.14) 2.52 (0.20) 3.63 (0.23) 2.54 (0.08) 2.44 (0.25)
λ 26.45 (3.31) 16.99 (2.33) 7.07 (0.86) 6.23 (0.51) 13.12 (0.75) 28.34 (14.16)
logL  940.7  1162.1  672.3  632.2  3486.3  74.3
QRE-CH-BRF
α 1.91 (0.16) 2.67 (0.27) 1.90 (0.16) 1.50 (0.15) 1.81 (0.08) 1.36 (0.32)
τ 2.56 (0.23) 3.23 (0.73) 3.70 (0.73) 3.80 (0.28) 2.90 (0.10) 3.54 (2.28)
λ 12.77 (1.80) 4.50 (0.73) 3.97 (0.47) 5.21 (0.45) 7.69 (0.50) 7.47 (3.96)
logL  911.9  1144.3  652.0  616.1  3411.3  73.9
Pooled
Table 11. Parameter estimates for the di®erent models with standard errors in parentheses.
34in the four charts in the right hand column of Figure ??. Again, it reproduced the patterns
observed in the data.
To check the robustness of our ¯ndings and to check it against the theoretical model, we
generated two simulated data sets based on the QRE-BRF model, using the pooled estimates
¸ = 4:23 and ® = 2:46. The ¯rst of these simulations uses the same signal sequences as in
the laboratory experiment but decisions are generated by the QRE-BRF model. The second
simulation uses a completely new draw of signal sequences. The Probit estimations based on the
simulated data sets are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 11. While there are some small
di®erences in magnitude, all coe±cients of theoretical interest are signi¯cant with the correct
sign.46 Note that the log-likelihoods for the simulated data are higher than for the real data.
This is likely caused by the fact that the simulations assume homogeneous agents, while we
would expect some heterogeneity to be present in the laboratory data.
6. Results III: Estimated Belief Trajectories
We use belief estimates generated from the QRE-BRF model to examine both the the infor-
mational e±ciency and to address hypotheses about the evolution of beliefs (B1-B3). How well
is the information from private signals aggregated? How high is the public belief on the correct
alternative after a sequence of decisions? How does this vary with our treatment variables, q
and T?
6.1. Informational E±ciency
As shown in Proposition 1, in a QRE the public belief about the correct alternative increases
on average with t, and converges to 1 as T approaches in¯nity. The convergence is slower for
the q = 5=9 treatments than for the q = 6=9 treatments. Of course, in any ¯nite sequence,
information cannot possibly reveal the correct alternative, because of a combination of noise in
the signal generation process and noise in the decision making process. Moreover, this noise
in signal generation is compounded by strategic considerations that a®ect the social learning
process.
46The only notable di®erence is the experience variable, which is not signi¯cant in the simulation using a
new batch of signal sequences, suggesting that its signi¯cance was spurious, due to more favorable order of
signals in later matches. (Indeed, there is no reason that experience should have had a signi¯cant e®ect in the
¯rst simulation.) In any case, the magnitude of the experience e®ects, to the extent they may possibly not be
spurious, is negligible.








Figure 4: Estimated beliefs using the QRE-BRF model for all
sequences in one of the (q = 5=9, T = 20) sessions.
Although we do not observe beliefs directly, we can use the theoretical QRE-BRF model
together with the observed choice data to obtain estimated public belief paths.47 This is done
for every sequence in the experiment. Using the pooled estimates ¸ = 4:23 and ® = 2:46, each
sequence of action choices implies a unique public belief. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which
shows the belief paths for all sequences in one of the q = 6=9 and T = 20 sessions. The belief
trajectories for other sessions exhibit similar features. Here the horizontal axis represents the
sequence of decisions, and the vertical axis the belief about the correct alternative. Each upward
tick in the belief paths corresponds to a correct choice and each downward tick to an incorrect
choice. Theoretically, for long enough sequences, the belief paths for almost all sequences should
converge to 1.
The simplest way to test Hypotheses (B1)-(B3) is to average the public belief about the
correct alternative across all sequences for a given treatment. This produces the four curves in
the left panel of Figure 5. The middle and right panels depict simulated average beliefs using
the QRE-BRF model and Nash model, respectively. The curves are obviously consistent with
the theoretical hypotheses.48
The comparison between the di®erent q treatments is a weak test since the paths are con-
structed using the theoretical model. That is, even if the sequences of signals and decisions
were exactly the same for all sequences in q = 6=9 and q = 5=9 session, the q = 6=9 curves
necessarily would lie strictly above the q = 5=9 curves. That said, the ordering also re°ects a
47Domowitz and Hung (2003) recently reported a social learning experiment using a belief elicitation procedure.
48The right most panel shows that the di®erence between the two q = 6=9 treatments is caused by the particular












































Figure 5: Estimated public beliefs about the true state by treatment (coded as in Figure 1).
In the left panel, estimated beliefs are based on observed signals and decisions. The middle
panel is based on the average of 100 QRE-BRF simulations of decisions, always using the
same sequence of signals as in the experiment. The right panel shows estimated beliefs
implied by Nash decisions based on the sequence of signals employed in the experiment.
salient di®erence between our q = 5=9 and q = 6=9 data, namely that cascades fall apart more
quickly, and are more often incorrect in the q = 5=9 data than in the q = 6=9 data (see Tables
5-8 of the previous section).
However, that the curves are increasing in t is not an artifact of the construction, but simply
re°ects the fact that there are more good cascades and fewer bad cascades toward the end of
a session than toward the beginning. In summary, we ¯nd strong support for hypotheses (B1),
(B2), and (B3), and somewhat weaker support for hypothesis (B4).
7. Conclusion
This paper reports the results of an information cascade experiment with two novel features:
longer sequences of decisions and systematic variation of signal informativeness. According to
standard game theory, neither of these treatments should be interesting, and neither should
produce signi¯cantly di®erent results. We ¯nd, however, that both of these treatment e®ects are
strong and signi¯cant, with important implications for social learning, information aggregation,
and e±ciency.
The longer sequences have several interesting features. First, there is almost a complete
absence of pure cascades, a proliferation of temporary cascades, including many repeated, re-
versed, and self-correcting cascades. Standard theory predicts that longer sequences will have
37more permanent cascades, and that temporary, repeated, reversed, and self-corrected cascades
never occur. Relatively uninformative signals lead to less stable dynamics, in the sense that
cascades are much shorter, more frequent, and reverse more often. These subtle but important
features of the dynamics are impossible to detect in the short sequences employed in previous
experiments.
To explain the observed features of the dynamics and the dependence on signal informa-
tiveness, we consider the logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE). In addition, we apply QRE
as a structural model to estimate base rate neglect and to test for heterogeneity in levels of
rationality. We ¯nd both to be signi¯cant factors in observed behavior. In particular, subjects
tend to overweight their signals, or, alternatively, underweight the public prior generated by past
publicly-observed choices.
Our experimental results con¯rm a wide range of hypotheses about the number and frequency
of di®erent kinds of cascades, e±ciency, and belief dynamics. Most of these hypothesis follow
logically from the informativeness of signals and a basic property of the QRE: deviations from
rationality occur and their likelihood is inversely related to their cost. In the context of infor-
mation cascades, this property implies that cascade breakers more often than not hold contrary
signals, and, hence, that deviations from cascades are highly informative. Learning continues
in a QRE even after a cascade forms or breaks, and temporary, repeated, reversed, and self-
correcting cascades arise as equilibrium phenomena. While standard cascade theory predicts
that learning ceases after a few initial decisions, our data show that information is continuously
being aggregated, providing evidence for the QRE prediction that for long enough sequences
public beliefs would be approximately correct.
38A. Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proofs of (i) and (ii): The proof of (i) is by induction. Recall that p1 = 1
2, so we only need
to show that 0 < pt < 1 implies 0 < p
¡
t < pt < p
+




qpt(1 ¡ F¸(1 ¡ 2¼a
t)) + (1 ¡ q)pt(1 ¡ F¸(1 ¡ 2¼b
t))
(qpt + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ pt))(1 ¡ F¸(1 ¡ 2¼a
t)) + ((1 ¡ q)pt + q(1 ¡ pt))(1 ¡ F¸(1 ¡ 2¼b
t))
;
with 1 > ¼a
t > ¼b
t > 0 de¯ned in (??) and (??), and F¸(x) = 1=(1 + exp(¡¸x)) the logistic
distribution with parameter ¸ and support (¡1;1). Since 1
2 < q < 1 and 0 < pt < 1 by
assumption, the denominator exceeds the numerator: p
+
t < 1. A direct computation shows
p
+
t ¡ pt =
pt(1 ¡ pt)(2q ¡ 1)(F¸(1 ¡ 2¼b
t) ¡ F¸(1 ¡ 2¼a
t))
(qpt + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ pt))(1 ¡ F¸(1 ¡ 2¼a
t)) + ((1 ¡ q)pt + q(1 ¡ pt))(1 ¡ F¸(1 ¡ 2¼b
t))
;
which is strictly positive because ¼a
t > ¼b
t. The proof that 0 < p
¡
t < pt is similar. Q.E.D.
Proofs of (iii) and (iv): Let `t = (1¡pt)=pt denote the likelihood ratio that A is correct. For
all t 2 T we have
E(`t+1 j! = A;`t) = `t;
i.e. the likelihood ratio constitutes a martingale, a basic property of Bayesian updating. Note
that pt is a strictly convex transformation of the likelihood ratio (pt = (`t + 1)¡1), so
E(pt+1 j! = A;pt) = E((`t+1 + 1)
¡1 j! = A;`t) > (E(`t+1 + 1j! = A;`t))
¡1 = pt;




t , see (ii). We sketch the proof of (iv). See
Goeree et al. (2006) for proof details, and Smith and Sorensen (2000) for a similar argument if
there are continuous signals with unbounded beliefs. First, limit points of the stochastic belief
process fptgt=1;2;¢¢¢ have to be invariant under the belief updating process. But (ii) implies that
pt+1 6= pt when pt 6= f0;1g, so the only invariant points are 0 and 1. Next, the Martingale
Convergence Theorem implies that `t converges almost surely to a limit random variable `1
with ¯nite expectation. Hence, `1 < 1 with probability one, which implies that p1 > 0 with
probability one and pt thus converges to 1 almost surely. Q.E.D.
39B. Appendix: Estimation Program
In the GAUSS program below we assume the experimental data are stored in an MT £ 2
matrix called "data"; every T rows correspond to a single sequence, or run, with a total of M
runs, the ¯rst column contains subjects' signals and the second column subjects' choices. The
coding is as follows: A choices and a signals are labelled by a 1 and B choices and b signals by a 0.
The outcome of the procedure is the log-likelihood for a single treatment (i.e. with a ¯xed preci-














IF signal==1 AND choice==1; p=p+; logL=logL+ln(P(A|a)); ENDIF;
IF signal==0 AND choice==1; p=p+; logL=logL+ln(P(A|b)); ENDIF;
IF signal==1 AND choice==0; p=p¡; logL=logL+ln(P(B|a)); ENDIF;







49The procedure is simple because information cascade experiments concern individual decision-making envi-
ronments, not games, so there is no need to solve ¯xed-point equations to compute the QRE.
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